Consumer Finance Litigation

Although courts across the country agree that “a plaintiff class should not be certified unless membership therein is ‘adequately defined and clearly ascertainable,’” the extent of what a plaintiff must provide to satisfy this “implicit requirement” to certification varies among circuit courts.  See Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Belcher, No. 18-90011, 2018 WL 3198552, at *3 (11th Cir. June 29, 2018) (citations omitted).  For example, some circuit courts have construed the requirement to “mean[] a plaintiff must demonstrate an ‘administratively feasible’ ...

For many of the claims asserted under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (the "FDCPA"), courts are required to apply the "least sophisticated consumer" standard in evaluating the claim, an "objective" test that assesses the alleged violation from the perspective of the hypothetical "least sophisticated consumer." See Landeros v. Pinnacle Recovery, Inc., 692 F. App'x 608, 612-13 (11th Cir. 2017); see also Leonard v. Zwicker & Assocs., P.C., 713 F. App'x 879, 881-82 (11th Cir. 2017). But as the Eleventh Circuit again made clear earlier this month in Lait ...

On Tuesday the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued what is already being touted as a landmark ruling in PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, No. 15-1177, 2016 WL 5898801 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 11, 2016), holding in a 2-1 decision that the structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the "CFPB"), and specifically its organization as a "single-Director independent agency" with no meaningful Presidential oversight, violates Article II of the United States Constitution, which in relevant part vests the authority to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" in ...

In the wake of the Supreme Court's ruling in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (U.S. May 16, 2016), a growing trend is emerging with respect to cases involving claims under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ("TCPA"). Indeed, while many early decisions held that "a violation of the TCPA is a concrete injury," see, e.g., Rogers v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., No. 1:15-cv-4016, 2016 WL 3162592, at *2 (N.D. Ga. June 7, 2016), more recently, some courts are requiring more. In fact, in Ewing v. SQM US, Inc. et al., Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo of the Southern District of ...

The Supreme Court's ruling in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (U.S. May 16, 2016), continues to have a substantial impact on federal courts, especially with respect to alleged statutory violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (the "FDCPA"). In fact, just last week the Third Circuit Court of Appeals relied on the Spokeo decision in reversing a district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff in Bock v. Pressler & Pressler, LLP, No. 15-1056, 2016 WL 4011150 (3rd Cir. July 27, 2016). The plaintiff in Bock had alleged ...

Following the Supreme Court's ruling in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (U.S. May 16, 2016), it is clear that "Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation," such that a plaintiff cannot "allege a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III." Id. at 1549. Yet, the Court did not go so far as to rule that "the risk of real harm cannot satisfy the requirement of concreteness," and instead recognized that "the violation of a procedural right granted by statute can ...

In a much-anticipated decision, the United States Supreme Court ruled on Monday in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, No. 13-1339, 2016 WL 2842447 (May 16, 2016), that a consumer cannot bring a lawsuit in federal court based only on a "bare procedural violation" of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 1681-1681y ("FCRA"), vacating the Ninth Circuit's earlier decision for failing to fully consider whether the plaintiff had adequately alleged an "injury in fact." See 2016 WL 2842447, at 2-3. Yet, while defendants had been arguing for months in district courts that the Supreme Court's ...

The writing was on the wall following Justice Elena Kagan's dissent in Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523 (2013), wherein Justice Kagan blasted the view that an unaccepted offer of complete relief made to a named plaintiff pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 is capable of mooting the plaintiff's individual (and putative class) claims as "wrong, wrong, and wrong again," id. at 1533 (Kagan, J., dissenting) - a position that every Court of Appeals to rule on the issue after Genesis Healthcare had adopted - and on January 20, 2016, the Supreme Court made it official. In a 6-3 ...

Following the Supreme Court's ruling in Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573 (2010), it is clear that the bona fide error defense set forth in section 1692k(c) of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 1692 to 1692p (the "FDCPA"), "does not apply to a violation of the FDCPA resulting from a debt collector's incorrect interpretation of the requirements of th[e FDCPA]." Id. at 604-05. But as the district court recently recognized in Gray v. Suttell & Associates et al., a putative FDCPA class action filed in the Eastern District of ...

Following the Eleventh Circuit's decision last year in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, the filing of a proof of claim on a time-barred debt in a bankruptcy case pending in the Eleventh Circuit's jurisdiction violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 1692-1692p ("FDCPA"). But as the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama recently made clear in Gurganus v. Recovery Management Systems Corp. (In re Gurganus), No. 7:14-ap-70054-BGC, 2015 WL 65089 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Jan. 5, 2015), before debtors start hauling creditors into court for something ...