Following the Supreme Court's ruling in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (U.S. May 16, 2016), it is clear that "Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation," such that a plaintiff cannot "allege a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III." Id. at 1549. Yet, the Court did not go so far as to rule that "the risk of real harm cannot satisfy the requirement of concreteness," and instead recognized that "the violation of a procedural right granted by statute can ...
In Etta Lowery v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, No. 2131060, 2015 WL 1525153 (Ala. Civ. App. Apr. 3, 2015), the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment on the pleadings entered in favor of Defendant-Appellee Wells Fargo on Plaintiff-Appellant Etta Lowery's claims relating to the notarization of her mortgage. Lowery had filed a complaint in the trial court against Wells Fargo alleging that her mortgage with Wells Fargo was void because it was notarized by a person she had never met. She also alleged that Wells Fargo concealed the improper notarization from her ...
In Young v. Wells Fargo, Case No. 12-1405 (1st Cir. May 21, 2013), the First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court's dismissal of plaintiff Susan Young's breach of contract claim premised on Wells Fargo's alleged failure to comply with its obligations under the Trial Period Plan ("TPP"), a temporary loan modification period during which Young applied for a permanent loan modification. Young alleged that, after falling behind on her mortgage payments, she entered into a series of discussions with Wells Fargo in an attempt to negotiate a loan modification. Eventually ...